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A

FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT:

EXPANDING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE
HOUSING FOR LATIN AMERICA'S LowAND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES
Jordan Rand*

HERE is a critical need for an overhaul of Latin American housing policy to address the dearth of available and affordable housing for low- and medium-income families. The severe housing
shortage has far-reaching effects on the Latin American economy as a
whole. The availability of adequate housing is of vital importance to a
prosperous society, and recognition of the relationship between adequate
housing and human dignity is not new.' In fact, access to adequate housing was first recognized by the United Nations as a fundamental human
right in 1948.2 This fundamental human right, however, is not being met
by current Latin American policies.
Nearly 65 percent of the Latin American population cannot afford to
buy even the cheapest new homes. 3 Equally discouraging is the fact that
nearly every Latin American country faces a dire shortage of housing, as
measured by available "dwelling units."'4 As this comment will demonstrate, the housing crisis in Latin America is attributable to a combination
of ineffective housing and finance policies, and legislative and judicial
barriers to an efficient marketplace. 5 Latin American governments, policy makers, and financial institutions must take immediate action to remedy this housing crisis. The situation is rendered even more imperative
by the fact that Latin America's urban population is growing at a rate of
4.5 percent per year, with urban-dwellers accounting for three-fourths of
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. B.S., University of
Texas at Dallas.
See, e.g., Miloon Kothari, Special Rapporteur to United Nations's Third Conference in Brussels on Least Developed Countries: Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (May 14-20, 2001), http://
www.unhchr.ch/housing/stat24ga.htm.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pt. 1, art. 25(1),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948).
Bruce Ferguson, Housing Finance Options for Low and Medium Income Families:
Analysis of the Latin America Experience, 18 HOUSING FIN. INT'L 11, 11-12 (2004).
Gerardo M. Gonzalez, Building Sustainable Housing Finance Markets: Proceedings
of the Housing Finance Roundtable in the Andean Region, 19 HoUsING FIN. INT'L
7, 8 (2005).
Id.

*J.D.,

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
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the total population. 6 In fact, "[b]y 2015, the United Nations projects
with a
nine Latin American cities will have 5 million or more residents,
7
combined population of more than 100 million people."
The focus of this comment will be an analysis of the current state of the
Latin American housing and mortgage finance markets, and an exploration of some viable options to increase the availability of affordable housing and the accessibility of mortgage options for low- and mediumincome Latin American families. The needs of this segment of the Latin
American population are not being met by current policies. The solution
to the current problem is two-fold: introducing legislation to encourage
the development of sustainable residential mortgage markets in Latin
America, and increasing the number of available dwelling units to meet
the anticipated population demands.
This comment recommends that the former be accomplished by lessening judicial and legislative restrictions on foreclosures and evictions for
defaulting borrowers, and encouraging the continued development of a
secondary mortgage market to diversify risk. The latter part of the solution can be accomplished through a variety of means, such as direct housing subsidies, direct government subsidization for the lowest-income
Latin Americans, increasing micro-financing options to enlarge and improve existing structures, and reducing legislative barriers to land titling
and ownership.
I. THE HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS IN
LATIN AMERICA
A. LATIN AMERICAN
1. Historical Considerations

MORTGAGE MARKET

One of the major factors affecting the overall health of Latin American
housing is the lack of robust mortgage markets. The majority of low- to
medium-income Latin American families have limited or no access to
traditional mortgage financing; this is one of the most significant factors
contributing to the lack of adequate and affordable housing in Latin
America. 8 The relationship between the financial markets and the availability of housing is symbiotic-one needs the other. When you consider
that the average home in Latin America costs close to six times a typical
family's annual income, 9 it is shocking that "less than one-fourth of all
housing in Latin America is financed through formal mechanisms, and
6. Jorge A. Brea, PopulationDynamics in Latin America, POPULATION BULL. (2003),

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3761/is_200303/ain9173891.
7. Id.

8.

ANOOP SINGH ET AL, Latin American FinancialSystems: Crises and Reforms, in
STABILIZATION AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EXPERIENCE SINCE THE EARLY 1990s 63 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occa-

sional Paper 238, 2005) http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/238/index.htm
[hereinafter Latin American FinancialSystems].
9. Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, Housing Finance in
Latin America: Time to Build a Better Market, 4 IDEA (IDEAS FOR DEVELOPMENT
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housing mortgage credit accounts for a small fraction of total credit." 10
Encouraging the continued, lasting development of the residential mortgage market, thereby increasing access to financing and reducing the massive burden on homeownership, is thus of paramount importance to any
sound Latin American housing policy.1
Mortgages are the primary means of financing housing throughout
much of the world, including the United States, Europe, and most of
Asia.' 2 The mortgage instrument has been in use for several hundred
years, and mortgages have historically played a tremendous "role in improving . . . [the] . . . economy and society.' 1 3 Like the United States,
mortgages in Latin America consist of loans payable over a "fifteen to
thirty year period for the acquisition of new housing for families from the
formal sector" 14 But despite the undeniable importance of mortgages in
acquiring housing, the development of a residential mortgage market in
Latin America has been exceedingly slow. For example, in the United
States, "mortgage loans as a percentage of GDP is [sic] almost fifty percent.' 5 In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the percentages are 2.1
percent, 2.4 percent, 9.5 percent, and 8 percent, respectively.' 6 This situation is representative of a severely underdeveloped mortgage market.
The reasons for this are two-fold: Latin America has historically suffered
from serious financial instability, and many of Latin America's low- and
medium-income families do not have access to credit from traditional
17
banks.
2.

Banking Systems

The financial systems in Latin America are primarily based on public
and private banks, 18 and Latin American countries generally have poorlydeveloped and illiquid securities markets. 19 Moreover, Latin America's
"banking systems are shallow and the scope of their activities is very narIN THE AMERICAS) 1, 1, available at http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/
pubi-vol4e.pdf. [hereinafter Housing Finance in Latin America].
10. Id.
11. Gerardo M. Gonzales Arrieta, Mortgage Loans and Access to Housing for LowIncome Households in Latin America, 85 CEPAL REV. 111, 112 (2005) [hereinafter Arrieta, Mortgage Loans].

12. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11-12.
13. Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive? A Commentary and Critique on
Mortgage Law's Birth, Long Life, and Current Proposalsfor Its Demise, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 69, 70 (2003).
14. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 12.
15. Georgette Chapman Poindexter & Wendy Vargas-Cartaya, En Ruta Hacia El
Desarrollo:The Emerging Secondary Mortgage Market in Latin America, 34 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 257, 262 (2002).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 262-63.
Latin American Financial Systems, supra note 8, at 63.
Id.
Id.
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row." 20 Latin America's "banking systems remain relatively small com' 21
pared with GDP, and the depth of intermediation is particularly low."
Compared with the "East Asian emerging markets" with ratios over 90
percent, "Deposit-to-GDP ratios" in Latin America are less than 50
22
percent.
Latin America experienced tremendous credit growth in the 1990s, but
a series of banking crises crippled the industry and drastically reduced the
availability of credit. 23 Throughout this time of financial upheaval, Latin
American capital markets were unable to serve as sources for "medium
to long-term funding. ' 24 Over the long-term, "[t]he pattern of credit
growth in Latin America has been marked by boom-bust cycles." '25 "Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico all follow this pattern," while Chile's credit
growth has been much more uniform due to economic stability and reforms in its financial markets. 26 During the constriction of Latin
America's capital markets, lenders looked to the United States and Europe for investors, because most foreign investors did not find Latin
27
America's tumultuous financial markets a risk worth taking.
Latin America's banking system operates in an environment that actually appears to discourage lending. 28 This is due to a combination of both
governmental and financial factors. Latin America's "historic experience
with inflation, social instability, and currency weakness" has undermined
public faith in the banking system. 29 Also, an "inefficient judiciary" has
repeatedly failed to protect the interests of creditors in the region. 30 The
civil law legal systems found in all Latin American countries "have the
weakest legal protections of investors" when compared with common law
systems. 3 1 In common law systems, the interests of creditors are adequately protected against defaulting borrowers; in the event of default, a
creditor can foreclose on the property that serves as security for the loan
amount. But in many Latin American countries, due to legislative and
judicial restraints on the ability of a creditor to foreclose on a home, the
creditor must engage in a multi-year battle before finally obtaining a
foreclosure.

32

Banks in Latin America do retain a strategic "advantage in the costly
collection and processing of information that is central to financial inter20. Joseph J. Norton, An Interim Fillingthe Gap in Multilateral,Regional, and Domestic Hard Law Deficiencies. Respecting Financial Services Integration within the
Americas, 12 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 153, 169 (2006).
21. Latin American Financial Systems, supra note 8, at 64.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 260.
25. Latin American Financial Systems, supra note 8, at 64.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 260.
See Norton, supra note 20, at 169.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 259.
Norton, supra note 20, at 169.

31. Id.

32. See infra text accompanying notes 75-87.
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mediation. '33 But Latin American banking systems still remain relatively
inefficient in terms of their ability to engage in credit transactions. 34 In
2000, the "Central Bank of Brazil reported that roughly one third of the
cost of commercial credit (with rates in excess of thirty percent) was attributable to the creditors' inability to collect on loans or to realize on
loan collateral. '35 Latin American "[blanks' operating costs. . . [amount]
to more than 90 percent of operating income, which is about a third
higher than banks in advanced countries. ' 36 This inefficiency is estimated
to cost Latin American countries over 10 percent of their GDP.37 The
weak performance by Latin American banks is due, in part, to its "continued reliance on interest earnings. '38 Competition from industrialized nations, new sources of funds from Asia, and globalization in the banking
39
sector have driven down the margins on traditional bank products.
Also because of high inflation, Latin American banks have historically
shied away from lending money for terms longer than three years.4 0 As a
result, mortgage credit is totally unavailable to approximately 50 to 70
percent of the Latin American population. 4 1 Where mortgage credit is
available, borrowers are often required to put as much as 50 percent
down to qualify for a loan. 42 "The unavailability and high cost of credit"
in Latin America is a reflection of risk and the "inability to obtain pay'43
ment in ...consumer loans quickly and inexpensively.
Even if potential Latin American borrowers could afford the huge
down payment and qualify for the mortgage loan, with interest rates hovering in the range of 15 to 20 percent, mortgage loans are prohibitively
expensive.4 4 The situation is even worse in Brazil, where the interest rate
charged on a one-year consumer loan averaged nearly 62 percent as of
May 2006. 45 Just a year earlier, the average rate of a one-year consumer
loan was 69 percent. 46 Because of these incredibly high interest rates,
there is evidence showing that as of 1998, only "one to fifteen percent of
the houses in Latin America had mortgages. ' 47 In Panama, for example,
33. Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 63-64.
34. See Boris Kozolchyk, Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee on Secured
Transaction Conference Transcript, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 324 (2001)
[hereinafter OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee].
35. Id.

36. Norton, supra note 20, at 169-170.
37. OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note 34, at 324.
38. Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 68.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 260.
Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11-12.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262.
OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note 34, at 324.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262.
Guillermo Parra-Bernal, Brazil Bank Loans Rise Fastest in Five Months in May
(Update 3) BLOOMBERG.COM, June 26, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arbDmqqklen4.
46. Id.
47. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262.
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"only 10% of homes are mortgaged. ' 48 The rate of mortgaged homes is
even lower in the Dominican Republic, only accounting for 2 percent of
the households in that country. 49 In Mexico, widely believed to be at the
forefront of affirmative mortgage financing policy, "only 'one in five
homes ...

carries mortgage financing." 50 And in Argentina, "only five

to ten percent of homeowners have mortgages."'5
3.

Causes of FinancialInstability in Latin America

This situation is a result of the convergence of a variety of distinct factors. By itself, each factor may or may not play a substantial role in suppressing the mortgage market. But in unison, these factors have all
contributed considerably to the present situation. Weakness in the Latin
American financial systems, 52 high risk of default by borrowers, barriers
to recovering money from delinquent borrowers, exceedingly low incomes, a disconnect between the "typical maturities of savings deposits
and credits," the lack of property titles, and legislative barriers to evicting
delinquent borrowers have all contributed to the stagnation of the resi53
dential mortgage market in Latin America.
Compounding the financial troubles facing the struggling mortgage
market is the fact that a secondary market for mortgages is only recently
beginning to emerge. 54 The importance of a secondary mortgage market
cannot be overstated. By solely relying on banks, without a robust secondary mortgage market to spread risk, Latin America cannot meet the demands of a burgeoning mortgage market. 55 Gerardo M. Gonzales
Arrietta explains:
Loans originated by these institutions remain as assets on their balance sheets for the entire length of the loan. Lending institutions
also take charge of administering and collecting payments on these
loans. In other words, they perform all the functions of the mortgage
process: funding and loan origination and servicing. That these institutions grant long-term loans with short-term savings [from deposits]
exposes them to potential risks of mismatch of maturities, and possibility of rates, where ceilings exist on mortgage interest; these risks
are concentrated in lending institutions. 56
The secondary market for mortgages serves to reduce these risks by
getting the loan off the bank's balance sheets before maturity, thereby
allowing the bank to make new loans. 57 But the fragility of Latin
America's primary mortgage markets cannot be overlooked. The pri48. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 12.
49. Id.
50. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262 (internal citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Latin American Financial Systems, supra note 8, at 70.
53. Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 1.

54. See generally Poindexter, supra note 15.
55. See Arrieta, Mortgage Loans, supra note 11, at 113.

56. Id. (translated by the author).
57. Id.

ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING

2007]

mary mortgage market is the engine that drives a secondary market for
mortgage backed securities. 58 Without high-quality loans that can be
securitized and sold into the secondary market, the health of the Latin
American housing and financial markets will not improve.
Other systemic factors contributing to the overall weakness of the
Latin American financial systems are low levels of savings,
"macroeconomic instability," "risk perceptions," and "volatile capital
flows." '59 The low overall level of savings in Latin American countries is
largely a result of low wages in the region. 60 But there is not a clear link
between per capita GDP and the rate of savings and, importantly, "coun'61
tries with higher savings rates also had larger loan-to-GDP ratios.
Macroeconomic instability in Latin America is largely a result of the
financial crises so common throughout the region. 62 The 1994 devaluation crisis in Mexico is a prime example of one of the many problems the
region has faced. 63 "In 1994 Mexico's crawling peg exchange rate system
collapsed and plunged the country into a deep recession despite massive
financial assistance from the international community. ' 64 In an event
known as the "tequila effect," many of Mexico's Latin American neighbors "experienced significant capital outflows. '65 During this crisis, the
"default rate of mortgages soared, banks abandoned mortgage lending,
and costly governmental intervention took place."'66 This occurrence
demonstrates the catastrophic effects that similar events have on the
overall macroeconomic health of the region. And Mexico is not alone;
many countries throughout Latin America still have "inflexible exchange
rate regimes and excessive fiscal deficits" and are constantly confronted
with the risk of inflation or hyperinflation. 67 In Latin America, the typical response in the mortgage markets to these inflationary pressures is the
'68
creation of "floating rate ... [or] single- or double-indexed mortgages.
These schemes have reduced the ability of borrowers to pay for their
loans, and have threatened the stability of the mortgage markets. 69 As a
result, Latin America is plagued with chronic inflation and heavy economic losses leading to widespread fear that Latin America is too risky
70
an investment.
The risk perceptions are a major factor in the underdevelopment of
primary mortgage markets in Latin America. 7' The repeated financial
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See infra Part II.B.1.
Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 70-73.
Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 2.
Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 70.
Id.

63. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 261.
64. Id. at 261 n.14.
65.

Id.

66. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 9.
67. Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 70.

68. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 9.
69. Id.
70. Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 70.
71. OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note 34, at 324.
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crises in Latin America "followed by deep restructuring has resulted in a
lack of adequate information on potential borrowers," and "[m]any longtime bank customers disappeared; and the new ones ... did not have long
credit histories

. . .

or did not have good collateral. ' 72 The risk percep-

tions were also increased due to unprofessional practices in originating
loans, such as basing creditworthiness on personal relationships rather
than sound lending principles. 73 Moreover, the inefficient laws addressing bankruptcy and foreclosure frightened away potential investors. As a
result of these occurrences, banks in Latin America became extremely
risk-averse 74at a time when the demand for credit was drastically
increasing.
Compounding the ups and downs of the Latin American financial sector was the roller coaster-like influx of capital from abroad. During the
1990s, the "implementation of exchange rate-based stabilization programs, the introduction of structural reforms, and often high domestic
interest rates triggered a rapid buildup of short-term capital inflows to
Latin America." '75 These inflows, which went from U.S. $10 billion in
1983-90 to U.S. $62 billion in 1996, triggered rapid 76expansion in Latin
America, and led to high inflation during the 1990s.
In addition to the systemic factors suppressing the growth of mortgage
markets, legislative controls that prevent mortgage lenders from evicting
defaulting borrowers and foreclosing on their properties are additional
factors that greatly suppress growth. 77 In many Latin American countries, various legislative policies enable defaulting borrowers to delay or
outright prevent lenders from evicting them for many years. 78 Argentina
has yet to harmonize its eviction laws, and "costs and time involved...
varies from one jurisdiction to another because of different rules and regulations."'79 In 2001, Argentina's lawmakers even went so far as to insti80 In 2003,
tute a twenty-one month ban on mortgage foreclosures.
81
ban.
Argentina's President sought to extend the
Even without active executive intervention against foreclosures, the
foreclosure process in Argentina can take as long as two years to complete. The same is true for Mexico, where the foreclosure process takes
almost two years. 82 The situation is even more dire in Uruguay, where
legal proceedings to evict a non-paying borrower can take as long as six
72. Latin American FinancialSystems, supra note 8, at 72.

73. Id.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.

76. Id.
77. Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 1-2.

78. Id. at 1.
79. Id.
80. Argentina to Extend Ban on Mortgage Foreclosures (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM,

Sept. 30, 2003, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=a8Dx
3H2p6XSk&refer=Iatin_america#.
81. Id.
82. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262.
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years.83 Brazil is by far the worst, with foreclosure laws delaying recovery
for up to seven years.84 These policies, while intended to protect debtors
from losing their homes, only serve to stifle residential mortgage lending
and exacerbate the existing shortage of mortgage options and available
housing. As an example of the economic cost of these ineffective policies, the foreclosure-associated "legal fees and related costs in some
countries" can be as high as "one-third [to] one-half of the total value of
mortgages worth $50,000 or less."'85 Because of this incredible potential
risk to lenders, it is not surprising that many are unwilling to lend money
to the low- and medium-income families that truly need the mortgage
86
financing.
Adding to the financial and regulatory factors affecting the availability
of mortgage financing is the low income level of most potential buyers in
Latin America. 87 "About half of Latin America's population lives with
per capita earnings of less two dollars per day, while 10 percent of the
population earns 50 percent of the region's total annual income. ' 88 This
earning discrepancy prevents low- and medium-income families from
qualifying for traditional loans and mortgage credit, and further contributes to the lack of adequate funding options for low- to middle-income
families.
The combination of factors affecting the development of a mortgage
market in Latin America must be immediately addressed to create the
type of vigorous and sustainable market the region so desperately needs.
The banking systems that currently support the vast majority of lending in
Latin America are not capable of meeting the future lending needs of
Latin American families. There is a need for an array of modern lending
programs that can adapt to: (1) the overall low income levels in the region; (2) the existing instability of the Latin American financial markets;
and (3) the nontraditional building and home expansion patterns of Latin
American families. But in unison with modifying the Latin American
lending system, the housing market must be addressed as well. Aggravating the situation is the increasing shortage of adequate and available
housing to meet the growing Latin American population, especially in the
89
urban centers.
B.

AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICA

It is estimated that, worldwide, personal residences account for nearly

75 to 90 percent of total household wealth. 90 But in many Latin Ameri83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 1.
Poindexter, supra note 15, at 262.
Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 2.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See discussion of blossoming urban population in Latin America, infra text accompanying notes 6-7.
90. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 8.
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can countries, there is a tremendous lack of adequate and available housing to satisfy the needs of low- to moderate-income families. 91 The
inadequate housing situation so common in Latin America is a major
contributor to the perpetuation of poverty and substandard living conditions throughout the region. 92 Because many of the low- and medium7
income families cannot "easily buy, sell, or borrow against their housing[,] [t]hey are thereby denied the benefits of financial leverage in.real
estate, a means of upward mobility for many in other regions."9 3 Furthermore, Latin American families without homes are unable to take advantage of other sources of revenue a home provides, such as its use for
micro-enterprise or as an income-producing asset. 94 "The vast majority
'95
of the working poor are self-employed and do not have fixed incomes.
For these Latin Americans, access to adequate housing is not just a right,
it is essential for their very livelihood.
"While most people in the region are housed in some fashion, there is a
large qualitative and quantitative housing deficit."'96 The quantitative
housing deficit in Latin America was estimated in 1995 to be approximately 28 million units. 97 In Columbia, for example, there is nearly a 28.7
percent "quantitative deficit" for urban households. 98 Also, inPeru, "26
percent of total housing deficit is explained by lacking dwelling units and,
in addition, there is a new demand for housing of about 90,000 units
yearly." 99 From 1960 to 1987, Peru's population jumped from 4.5 to 14
million people. 10 0 Presently, 73 percent of Peru's population lives in urban areas, and the current total housing shortage is estimated at 1.5 million homes.""1 In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, and Brazil, the urban
91. Id.
92. Inter-American Development Bank, Housing Challenges and Opportunitiesat the
Base of the Pyramid, http://www.iadb.org/bop/Area4-text.cfm?language=En&
parid=2&itemlid=2&-item2id=5 (last visited Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Housing
Challenges].
93. Id.

94.

JENNIFER DUNCAN, HABITAT OF HUMANITY LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN
CAUSES OF INADEQUATE HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 27

(World Bank 2004),
15210_causes.pdf.

95.

available at

http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/

CTR. FOR URBAN DEV. STUDIES, HARV. UNIV. GRADUATE SCH. OF DESIGN,
HOUSING MICROFINANCE INITIATIVES. SYNTHESIS AND REGIONAL SUMMARY:

ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WITH SELECTED CASE STUDIES 93 (MicroLINKS (Microenterprise Learning, Information, and Knowledge

Sharing 2000), available at http://www.microlinks.org/ev-en.php?ID=7454_201&
ID2=DOTOPIC (follow "housingmicrofinanceinitiatives" hyperlink) [hereinafter HOUSING MICROFINANCE INITIATIVES).

96. Housing Challenges, supra note 92.
97. Gerardo M. Gonzales Arrieta, Access to Housing and Direct Housing Subsidies:
Some Latin American Experiences, 69 CEPAL REV. 141, 142 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Arrieta, Access to Housing].
98. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 8.
99. Id.
100. Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban Poverty in Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1109, 1137 (2004).
101. Id.
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population is 89, 84, 80, and 78 percent respectively.10 2 Across Latin
America as a whole, the housing deficit is estimated to be fifty million
10 3
units.
Exacerbating the housing shortage is the fact that, as previously stated,
nearly 65 percent of the Latin American population cannot afford even
the least-expensive new homes.' 0 4 In low-income Latin American countries, nearly one-third of the population lives in "inadequate structures,"
and nearly half live in what are described as "poor housing conditions.' 10° 5 During the period from 1980 to 1997, the number of poor Latin
Americans rose from 136 to 204 million. 10 6 One third of Latin Americans
are impoverished-15 percent extremely So.107 The situation in urban areas is even bleaker: 64 percent of urban dwellers are impoverished, and
the number is quickly increasing.' 0 8 Overall, thirty million Latin American households live in inadequate and sub-standard conditions.10 9 Some
estimates even state that half of the Latin American population is living
in "unsatisfactory conditions."' 0
The typical housing situation for many low- and medium-income Latin
American families is undoubtedly bleak. Because most of these families
cannot qualify for a mortgage loan or other traditional bank-based financing, their typical housing conditions "consist of a plot of land with
toilet, the improvement or extension of an existing house, or the replacement of a house in a state of deterioration.""' The Latin American "legal and regulatory systems" only serve to discourage the development of
affordable housing and hinder the wide availability of mortgage credit for
new housing and home improvement. 112 Lost in the economic costs,
however, is the tremendous toll that insufficient housing has on living
conditions in Latin America. 113 "Inadequate housing and overcrowding
are associated with a variety of public health issues, such as poor sanitation, contagious disease, domestic violence,... high rates of infant mortality" and high rates of crime. 1 4 Moreover, "[r]esearchers have found
that the cost of purchasing services such as water and electricity outside
of the formal sector is significantly higher than in the formal sector, and
so further increases poverty in settlement areas. 1" 5 According to the U.
N. Centre for Human Settlements-Habitat, there are over 130 million
102.

HOUSING MICROFINANCE INITIATIVES, supra note 95, at 91.
103. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 259 n.7.
104. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11.
105. Housing Challenges, supra note 92.
106. DUNCAN, supra note 94, at 26.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Housing Challenges, supra note 92.
110. Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 142.
111. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11.
112. Housing Challenges, supra note 92.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. DUNCAN, supra note 94, at 27.
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116 people living in "slums" in Latin America and the Caribbean.
A number of factors contribute to the lack of adequate housing in
Latin America. The most obvious factor-the growing Latin American
population-is unavoidable, and is beyond the scope of this comment.
But factors such as low incomes, excessive governmental regulation of
land, and notoriously difficult and time-consuming bureaucratic hurdles
to titling and purchasing land, can be rectified by affirmative governmental policies. The low income levels in Latin America are only part of the
equation; the inequitable distribution of wealth in the region is also to
blame. Latin America "has the worst income distribution in the world"

and the "'[g]reatest concern about the

. . .

region's pattern of economic

and social development is not poverty per se, but rather the way income
is distributed."' 1 17 Change is desperately needed because these factors
are pushing the possibility of land ownership further and further out of
the reach of the typical low- to medium-income Latin American
family.1 1 8
II.
A.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

REFORMS TO INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF ADEQUATE HOUSING IN

LATIN AMERICA

Even if it were possible to immediately reform the lagging mortgage
lending system in Latin America, the simple fact remains that most lowand medium-income Latin American families cannot afford to purchase
new housing. With the current state of the Latin American building market, the price of a new housing structure in "Mexico City, Guadalajara or
Monterey, is equivalent to ten times the cost of extending a house." 119
While this price is representative of the huge cost in Mexican cities, it can
be extrapolated to Latin America as a whole.
Because of this situation, any reformation of the Latin American housing policy must initially focus on other means of enabling low- and medium-income Latin Americans to afford adequate housing that meets
their shelter and sanitation needs. One of the quickest and, at the present
time, most realistic ways to accomplish this monumental task is to focus
energy in the short-term on extending and improving existing housing to
meet the needs of Latin American families. 120 This can be accomplished
through a renewed housing regime focusing on a direct housing subsidy
system, governmental housing programs for the lowest-income families,
and the encouragement of micro-financing programs to enable families to
116. Gustavo Gonzilez, Latin America: Building Unity - and Decent Housing, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY,

June 23, 2006, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?id

news=33747.
117. DUNCAN, supra note 94, at 29.

118. Housing Challenges, supra note 92.
119. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11.
120. See id. at 11-12.
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expand, build, and refurbish their own homes.1 21
1. Direct Housing Subsidies
Direct governmental housing subsidies are one approach to curb the
present Latin American housing shortage. Direct housing subsidies, as
opposed to more traditional social housing, are "an explicit, once-only,
non-repayable contribution given by the State to families that comply
with certain established requirements in order to provide them with a
purchasing power greater than that afforded by their own income ... thus
[it is] a demand subsidy, not a subsidy for supply. 112 2 But due to huge
demand in Latin American countries where direct housing subsidies have
1 23
been instituted, there is often a long wait to qualify for these subsidies.
The primary function of direct housing subsidies is to increase the
purchasing power of low- and middle-income Latin Americans, those
who comprise the majority of potential housing demand, and encourage
the growth of private development in the housing sector. 12 4 These subsidies also can be used to help these low- and middle-income families to
improve their existing homes, or help qualify for mortgage loans for new
dwellings.1 25 The subsidy "cover[s] the cost for provision of services, acquisition of land, and building of a top structure. ' 12 6 But the direct housing subsidies must be portable, thus giving families the right to choose
whether to upgrade or move to a new home. Furthermore, these subsidies
must also be supplemented with other types of credit assistance such as
1 27
micro-loans.
The focus on direct subsidies, rather than the more paternalistic involvement traditionally played by the state, is a function of the historic
failure of programs in which the state was heavily involved in providing
1 28
low-cost housing to low- and medium-income Latin American families.
Programs in which the state "played a direct role in building and financing dwellings . . . by offering loans at subsidized interest rates or subsi-

dizing the prices of the dwellings" were inefficient and failed to produce
12 9
the goals sought.
Under state-controlled mortgage and housing markets, the state "overregulated the operation of the markets and agents involved-by establishing ceilings for the interest rates ... for example-and played a direct

role in building and financing dwellings ... by offering loans at subsidized
interest rates or subsidizing the prices of the dwellings. ' 130 In fact, such
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 12.
Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 143.
See Atuahene, supra note 100, at 1158.
Arrieta, Mortgage Loans, supra note 11, at 115.
Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 143.
Atuahene, supra note 100, at 1158.
Ferguson, supra note 3, at 14.
Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 142-43.
Id. at 142.
Id.
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programs were counterproductive and led to the state displacing private
sector companies and investment. 3 1 "Publicly-owned mortgage lenders
usually have poor quality underwriting, politically motivated lending, in132
appropriate instruments, and weak or non-existent risk management."
The net result of these paternalistic government programs was to drive
builders and financial institutions out of the low- and medium-income
marketplace. This was not only counterproductive to the intended goals;
it also hindered the long-term growth of the housing industry in the countries where these policies were utilized.
The direct subsidy program prevents the negative effects of direct government involvement in the financing of housing to low- and mediumincome families. By increasing the purchasing power of these families,
the direct housing subsidy program works through the market, rather
than displacing the market. Demand subsidies are considered "more efficient than supply subsidies (in the form of State-provided housing), since
they entail fewer losses in terms of the consumer's welfare, less detriment
to the consumer's sovereignty and lower housing costs. ' 133 Another benefit of a direct housing subsidy over the traditional concept of social housing is that the governments are able to budget for the identifiable and
measurable subsidy amount, as opposed to attempting to budget for fluc13 4
tuating interest rates.
In countries where demand housing subsidy systems have been implemented, such as Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Venezuela, 135 El Salvador, Uruguay, and Paraguay, 136 it has been quite
successful. But there has often been a lack of commitment by the state to
fully fund the programs. 137 Fortunately, that is not true across the board.
Chile, Costa Rica, and Columbia all funded demand subsidies with over 1
percent of their respective budgets, and did so for more than a ten-year
period.1 3 8 This long-term commitment by Latin American governments
is the key for successful implementation and continued success for direct
housing subsidies. For direct housing subsidies to make a difference in
curbing the shortage of adequate and available housing, Latin American
governments must commit to fully funding the programs for a sufficient
period of time to allow the subsidies to work. Moreover, there also must
be a vigorous primary market for mortgages, a fully functioning secondary market for mortgages in general, and, in particular, for the "low-cost
dwellings of the type covered by the subsidies."'1 39 Without these factors,
the direct subsidy program will only serve to push players out of the market, just as traditional subsidies often do.
131. Id. at 142-43.
132. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 13.
133.

Arrieta, Mortgage Loans, supra note 11, at 115.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Ferguson, supra note 3, at 13.
Id.
See Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 146.
Ferguson, supra note 3, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 150.
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Governmental Housing Programsfor the Lowest Income Families

Despite the problematic nature of direct governmental involvement in
the provision of housing for low-income families, there is a need for such
involvement when it comes to providing homes for the lowest-income
Latin American families. These families, often falling within the two-dollars-a-day-range, 140 are not able to take advantage of traditional funding
sources due to their extremely low incomes. Supply-side housing subsidies have the potential to assist this segment of the population in obtaining homes where demand subsidies fail. For example, "[t]he demand
subsidies system has allowed considerable access to housing for the medium-low income group, that is, families with incomes of 3.5 to 6 times
the minimum wage, depending ...

on the country in question ...

but,

generally they have not reached low-income families. 1 4 1 Therefore, supply subsidies are a necessary supplement to demand subsidies. "For the
low-income market segment, subsidies should focus on [both] improving
'142
living conditions and increasing new suitable housing options.
Historically, government subsidies in Latin America have predominantly addressed the upper-middle income population. 143 This is likely
because that segment is better able to take advantage of the government
subsidies and use them to qualify within the traditional financing system.
While this may make economic sense, it fails to meet the needs of the
segment of the population that needs government assistance the most. A
more prudent approach to government aid would be to focus government
subsidies and direct government involvement on the lowest-income families, and allow direct housing subsidies and reforms of the financial markets to fulfill the needs of higher-income individuals and families. In
other words, the subsidies must be appropriate for the particular population segment they seek to assist.
As an example of government-sponsored housing programs directed at
the needs of extremely low-income Latin Americans, Venezuela dedicated over $500 million for government housing projects in 2004.144 This
program was in response to an estimated housing shortage in Venezuela
of 1.8 million units. 145 These housing projects meet the aims of increasing
new housing options for low-income Latin Americans. Such programs
140. See supra text accompanying note 86. These families, due to their low incomes,
cannot qualify for any traditional mortgage loans or other financial assistance. The
direct housing subsidies program provides modest assistance for renovating or expanding their existing homes and flats. But with this extremely low-income group,
the conditions of their housing are often quite poor. See supra text accompanying
note 112 regarding the unfortunate conditions associated with very low standards
of living, such as "poor sanitation, contagious disease, domestic violence, . . . high
rates of infant mortality" and high rates of crime.
141. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 15.
142. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 12.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Robin Nieto, Public Housing ProgramAttempts a Housing Revolution, VENEZUELANALYSIS,

145. Id.

Sept. 6, 2004, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/685.
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are most likely to succeed when the finance "model recognizes that the
State alone is incapable of solving the housing deficit,
so that State action
'14 6
must be such as to stimulate private investment.
3.

Micro-financing Programs

Most low- and middle-income Latin Americans are excluded from the
traditional financial and lending system, and are wholly reliant upon personal savings and other acquired wealth for meeting their housing
needs. 14 7 Moreover, in Latin America, like other developing countries,
"low income households usually prefer to improve and expand their current homes rather than purchase new units. ' 148 This is because the families have already developed social and economic ties to their existing
neighborhood. 149 Moreover, many families prefer to refurbish and expand on their existing homes because the quality of social housing is
often quite poor due to mass production and budget restraints. 150 It is
estimated that in developing countries, 70 percent of development occurs
this way.151 Because that is the case, efforts to broaden the availability of
traditional mortgages for the purchase of new homes will either not appeal, or will be out of reach, to a broad segment of the Latin American
population. Micro-financing is therefore a viable solution that allows
low- and medium-income Latin American families to obtain the financing
that they need to improve and expand their existing homes.
Micro-financing is a technique whereby the financing entity grants
"small loans, generally from U.S. $500 to $5,000, for low-cost solutions
such as improvement, extension, and construction of a house on a family's own plot of land. ' 152 The interest rates charged on micro-loans, usually only 2 to 3 percent, are far lower than the 15 to 20 percent interest
rates charged by banks and other more traditional lenders. 153 The primary aims of microfinance and micro-credit are reducing poverty through
housing finance and enabling low- and medium-income families to protect themselves against economic risk.154 Microfinance gained renown in
146.

Arrieta, Access to Housing, supra note 97, at 143.

147. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 15.
148.

Michael Goldberg & Marialisa Motta, Microfinance for Housing: The Mexican
Case, 5 J. MICROFINANCE 51, 51 (2003), available at http://marriottschool.byu.edu/
esrreview/articles/article79.pdf. See also Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11 ("Surveys
consistently demonstrate that low income families notably prefer to improve their

current home in their present neighbourhood instead of relocating to a new unit
under social housing programs.") Because of this factor, microfinance programs
are far better suited to the needs of the people and the realities of their situation.

149. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 11.
150. Id. at 12.
151. Donatus Okpala, Naison Mutizwa-Mangiza & Iouri Moisseev, Financing Urban
Housing: United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements, GLOBAL URBAN
DEV. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 14, available at http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag06
Vol2Issl/Okpala,%20Mutizwa-Mangiza,%20& %20Moisseev.htm.
152. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 12.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L.
271, 273-74 (2004).
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the 1980s due to successful micro-credit "programs such as the Grameen
1 55
Bank, launched by Mohammed Yunus."'
There are two key benefits to micro-loans. One is the fact that because
"housing microfinance has typically short-term maturities, microfinance
institutions can better fit the terms of their assets and liabilities, thereby
overcoming the typical mismatch involved in traditional mortgage lending when funded with short-term liabilities."1 56 The second relates to the
realities of making loans to low- and medium-income householdsnamely the inability of this segment of the population to qualify for traditional funding. 157 With micro-loans, the underwriting process is streamlined because of the small amount of the loans. Unlike traditional
mortgage loans, micro-loans do not require the extensive verification of a
"permanent, sufficient and verifiable source of income" and "legal tenancy of the property." 5 8 This verification is often extremely difficult in
Latin America due to the inconsistency of titling laws and real estate
ownership. The majority of "low- to medium-income families cannot sustain the payment of a [traditional] loan for the acquisition of a new, lowcost home produced by the formal sector, and frequently do not possess
title deeds, nor have formal income."'1 59 Micro-financing is a viable alternative to the more traditional means of obtaining credit. "[S]hort-term
maturities and small-sized amounts associated with housing microfinance,
together with additional instruments such as non-traditional collateral
and innovative criteria to determine credit eligibility, can ease the accessibility to this sort of housing finance for lower-income families.' 60
In a 2004 study by ACCION International, the average balance for
micro-loans in Latin America was $634.161 Micro-financing has traditionally focused on providing access to credit for low- and medium-income
individuals, rather than emphasizing savings programs. 162 This type of
lending enables these low-income groups to take advantage of financial
and housing opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable to them
were they to rely on traditional financial markets. "In Latin America,
where commercialization has advanced most rapidly, commercial banks
and regulated MFIs provide some 74% of total microfinance across the
region as of 2001, when not long ago microfinance was provided almost
63
exclusively by NGOs and unregulated cooperatives.'
The Dominican Republic represents a case study in successful
microfinance initiatives. The country has many of the institutional factors
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 273.
Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Ferguson, supra note 3, at 12.
Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 13.
Emily Berkman, Note, Microloans as a Community Reinvestment Act Compliance
Strategy, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 329, 329-30 (2006).

162.

Aaron Jones, Note, Promotion of a Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in
Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoI'Y 187, 189 (2006).
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164
that facilitate the establishment and success of microfinance ventures.
For example, there are already "five sound microfinancing entities, two
165
private development banks, and 13 rural savings and lending entities.
Moreover, the programs currently being implemented in the Dominican
Republic provide not only for micro-loans and micro-credit, but also for
funds aimed at improving infrastructure in the low- and medium-income
neighborhoods. 166 Organizations such as FIE in Bolivia and PRODEL in
Nicaragua are currently working to serve the housing microfinance needs
of low-income groups by "supporting housing improvement activities of
municipal authorities and community groups and by offering short-term
loans to individuals sufficient for small-scale upgrading and repairs such
as building new roofs, improving floors, or adding a new room. ' 167 In
Guatemala, Fundacion Genesis Empresarial is providing micro-loans for
168
the development of infrastructure such as electricity and water.
Unfortunately, as is the case in the Dominican Republic and much of
Latin America, "microfinance is estimated to reach only 25% of the total
potential market across the region. ''1 69 The capability of micro-financing
entities to provide much needed assistance to Latin America has been
proven time and again where micro-loans have been used. But the reach
of microfinance entities must be broadened to reach a larger proportion
of the Latin American populace.

4.

Legal Reforms Relating to Land Ownership

Two of the most important legal reforms for improving the conditions
and availability of adequate housing in Latin America are establishing, or
harmonizing, the region's land titling laws, and providing access to more
land for low- and medium-income families. The land titling reforms serve
to provide security for Latin Americans living in traditional and nontraditional housing situations. Furthermore, providing more access to
land for low- and medium-income families will result in a more equitable
distribution of land throughout the wealth strata.
Land titling reform is an often overlooked yet extremely important aspect of a successful Latin American housing policy. For instance, "[1and
titling resulted in higher investment in land in Costa Rica, Brazil... Honduras, and Jamaica, and in increased land values in Brazil, Honduras
164. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 13.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id. at 15. The approach taken in the Dominican Republic is a sound one. The
microfinance programs are teamed up with other government subsidies to address
several factors contributing to the substandard housing conditions. The first factor
is the poor quality of many of the homes in the region. The second factor is the
general state of disrepair, as well as the lack of basic sanitation and other necessary
infrastructure that perpetuate the dismal conditions. By providing subsidies for
basic services, the Dominican Republic is providing an impetus for self-help home
repair, which in turn can bring more funding to the area.
167.
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[and] Peru."' 70 The United Nations, in its Best Practices Handbook 2003,
describes land titling, or secured land tenure, as "'(i) protection against
eviction; (ii) the possibility of selling, and transferring rights through inheritance; (iii) the possibility ... (of having a)

. ..

mortgage, and access to

credit under certain conditions."' 17' Land titling or secured land tenure
can be formal or informal, depending on whether the jurisdiction recog17 2
nizes legal title to land.
Proponents of secured land tenure or legal titling "argue that:
(1) families who have legally secure title to their home are more
likely to make improvements to it, as they are less concerned with
eviction; (2) families with secure title no longer have to spend scarce
time and resources defending the rights to their land and home; (3)
families with secure title are able to access commercial financing
through mortgages and short-term loans; and (4) providing secure
legal title increases the value of the land and house, thus increasing
wealth to the home-owning family. 173
But like with everything else in life, titling programs have a potential
downside.
One of the more serious issues with titling programs is the possibility of
pricing the low- and middle-income segment out of the market. This occurs when title formalization increases the value of land so much that
these low-income families cannot afford to own land. 174
In addition to land titling reform, increasing access to land for low- and
middle-income Latin Americans is vital to rectifying the present housing
shortage. The "[ljack of access to land by the poor is the second most
noted cause of poverty housing in Latin America."' 75 The unavailability
of land in both rural and urban areas serves to exclude low-income families from the housing market. In rural areas, a few wealthy individuals
hold the majority of the land. 176 Additionally, charitable organizations
and mining companies also hold a large percentage of rural lands. 177 In
contrast, the high price of land in urban areas precludes the poor from
obtaining adequate housing, and marginalizes them to "illegal or 'squatter' settlements.' 178 When confronted with the available options, lowand medium-income families must choose between poor, over-crowed
slums, or resort to the aforementioned land invasion. 179 Surprisingly,
state ownership of urban land is quite limited, and urban lands owned by
the state have frequently been lost to squatter settlements. 180
170. Atuahene, supra note 100, at 1112.
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REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE MARKETS

1. Expand the Primary Mortgage Markets in Latin America
As previously discussed, the primary mortgage markets in Latin
America are severely underdeveloped. As an example of the room for
expansion of the primary mortgage markets, Gonzalez found that "more
than 20% out of the total approved subsidies in Columbia has not been
disbursed because of lack of access to mortgage credit for beneficiaries." 18 1 There is a scarcity of credit available to the majority of the
Latin American population, and the credit that is available is extremely
expensive due to the generally high risk of default and mismatch of maturities. Expanding the primary mortgage markets in Latin America is crucial if the future financial needs of low- and medium-income Latin
Americans are to be met.
Strengthening the primary mortgage markets will enable Latin American lenders to advance mortgage loans to a broader segment of the population. Moreover, "[t]he expansion of primary mortgage markets is also
important given the relevance of a well-developed primary market to
support the creation of a secondary mortgage market
which allows the
'182
establishment of linkages with the capital market.
Peru represents a case study in the typical underdeveloped primary
mortgage market in Latin America. The Peruvian primary mortgage
market is, like many of the Latin American countries, an "incipient market. ' 183 In 1999, the total volume of the portfolio of Peruvian mortgages
was U.S. $1 billion. 184 While this may seem like a large amount for a
developing country, in comparison with its neighbors with more fully-developed primary mortgage markets-namely Chile and Colombia with $6
1 85
billion and $8.3 billion respectively-Peru is just beginning to develop.
The embryonic status of Peru's primary mortgage industry is further illustrated by the fact that its "mortgage portfolio only represents 7% of the
total banking portfolio, while 78% of the total mortgage portfolio is con86
centrated in only four banks.'
Across Latin America, there are measures in place to increase access to
the primary market for low- and medium-income families. Governments
and private sector institutions alike are taking measure to increase financial access. In November 2006, the International Finance Corporation
and Merrill Lynch Capital, Inc. signed a $100 million line of credit with
Metrofinanciera, S.A. de C.V. to fund mortgages for low- and medium181. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 10.
182. Id. at 13.
183. Gerardo M. Gonzales, Considerationsfor the Development of a Mortgage Market
in Peru, 15 HOUSING FIN. INT'L 45, 48 (2000).
184. Id. at 48.

185. Id.
186. Id.
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income Mexicans. 187
2.

Encourage the Continued Development of A Secondary Market For
Mortgages
a.

The Secondary Mortgage Market

"The development of a secondary mortgage market can play a significant role in creating sustainable housing finance activity. ' 188 In order for
a housing market to operate efficiently, the market needs long-term investors and instruments. 189 Despite Latin America's rocky financial past,
the potential investors are likely there. The key, therefore, is modernization of Latin America's secured financing laws. But before a sustainable
secondary mortgage market can exist in Latin America, four conditions
must be met: "(a) a sufficient legal, tax, and regulatory framework; (b) a
robust primary mortgage market; (c) capital market preparedness and appetite for mortgage-backed debt instruments; and (d) economic incentives for secondary market participation." 190 The expansion of a
secondary mortgage market is essential for successful housing policy in
Latin America.
Latin America, however, still faces significant roadblocks to the establishment of efficient secondary markets For instance, "in many countries
there are not enough mortgages to pool together." 191 These are the challenges that Brazil and Mexico are currently facing. Also, Latin American
mortgage markets have a long way to go in harmonizing lending guidelines, establishing a uniform credit system, and standardizing the mort92
gage underwriting process.'
b.

The Securitization Process

Securitization is a technique originally developed in the United States
during the 1970s. 193 Initially used for the resale of mortgages, securitization has subsequently spread to "other types of cash flows."'1 94 Currently,
there are two general forms of securitizations: "mortgaged-backed and
asset-backed securitizations."' 9 5 The most common mortgaged-backed
security (MBS) is the "pass-through" security that is representative of
ownership in a pool of mortgages, thus enabling the owner to realize
187. IFC, Merrill Lynch Sign Warehousing Line of Credit with Metrofinanciera,EMERGING MARKETS ECONOMY, Nov. 29, 2006, http://www.emeconomy.com/LatinAmerica/97048-IFC,_MerrillLynch-sign-warehousingjline of creditwithMetro
financiera.htm.
188. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 16.
189. Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 1.
190. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 16.
191. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 279.
192. Id.
193. Claire A. Hill, Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 521, 523 (2002).

194. Id.
195. Erica W. Stump, Securitizations in Latin America, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 195,

200 (2000).
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profit from the collection of payments. 196 The security is of the "passthrough type because 'the loans are passed-through to the investor."197
investor, however, as a small percentage
Not all of the profit passes to the198
is reserved to pay for expenses.
In the 1980s, emerging markets such as Mexico began securitizing such
cash flows. "The first transaction was done by the Mexican telephone
company TelMex" where "TelMex securitized its rights to receive payments from AT&T for the Mexican portion of telephone calls made to
Mexico from the United States-that is, the portion taking place between
the United States-Mexico border and the Mexican destination." 199 As
part of the transaction, "TelMex sold its rights to the payments from
and
AT&T to a pool; the pool sold interests in the payments to investors,
200
investors.
the
from
received
it
amount
paid to TelMex the
Securitization of a mortgage is the "'process of packaging individual
loans and other debt instruments, converting the package into a security
or securities, and enhancing their credit status or rating to further their
sale to third-party investors.' 20 1 Poindexter and Vargas-Cartaya give an
insightful walk-through of the securitization process:
The first step involves the origination of mortgages to be used as
collateral for the securities. The mortgages are then pooled and sold
to an SPV (also known as a special purpose entity). At this stage, a
rating agency evaluates the investment risk of the pool. Then, the
mortgage pool is tranched (i.e., divided into classes) with various
combinations of mortgages and subordination levels. The issuer
takes into account the capital market forces at that moment and considers if there is a need for credit enhancement, and if so, what form
it will take. Once this is done, the SPV sells an interest in the pool to
third party investors. The securities are then traded in the secondary
market.
Other parties in the transaction include the trustee, the master, and
special servicers. The trustee represents the trust or SPV that holds
the legal title to the collateral for the benefit of the investors. The
trustee's duties include holding the mortgage collateral, passing the
funds gathered by the loan servicers to investors, and supervising the
loan servicers, including the appointment of a new servicer if the
terms between the parties are violated. The master servicer must
service the mortgages that collateralize the securities on behalf of
and for the benefit of the investors. Duties include collecting the
mortgage payments, passing the funds to the trustee, and providing
mortgage performance reports to investors. Some transactions also
196. Mark Adelson, MBS Basics, in

NUTS

&
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& INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 359, 364 (Clifford E Kirsch & Robert S Risoleo eds.,
UNDERSTANDING

THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET

2007).
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make use of a special servicer, who assumes servicing responsibilities
when a loan goes
into default and carries out the workout or foreclo20 2
sure process.
The benefit of securitizing mortgages and selling the security into a secondary market is that it gives the originator the ability to improve its
balance sheet through the sale of the assets to another entity and the
receipt of cash for the transaction. 20 3 Latin American governments recognized the limitations of their traditional financial systems, and "since
1994 many of the countries in the region have modified or created new
laws to encourage and simplify the securitization of financial assets, including mortgages. '20 4 There are already securitization programs underway in Columbia, Mexico, and Peru "where the agenda for publiclyowned second-tier institutions is markedly set towards replacing their
'20 5
typical funding role for an innovative guarantor role.
3. Increasing Legal ProtectionsAfforded to Mortgage Creditors
Reforming the secured transaction laws in Latin America is one of the
key facets of an effective overhaul of the financial industry. But without
similar changes in the system of judicial enforcement of debts, lenders
will not be willing to risk their investment dollars in Latin America. A
country's foreclosure laws have a direct impact on the willingness of lenders to engage in mortgage transactions in that jurisdiction. 20 6 The ease of
obtaining judicial enforcement of a debt is not the only concern; the time
required by the foreclosure process is also a pressing matter for creditors.
As was observed from the historical experience of creditors attempting to
foreclose on a defaulting borrower, Latin American governments placed
many hurdles in the path of creditors' attempts to get their money back.
Reforming these inefficient systems will require streamlined processes for
eviction and foreclosure.
As Poindexter and Chapman explain, the efficiency of a county's foreclosure law and protections afforded creditors have a direct and substantial impact on a lender's willingness to enter that market:
A major factor in the pricing of any mortgage-backed security is derived from the loss expectations in the collateral pool supporting the
securities. In this context, loss is a function of the following: (1) the
percentage of the pool balance that experiences delinquency; (2) the
percentage of the delinquent loans that go into default; and (3) the
loss severity associated with those defaulting loans. Overall portfolio
loss is the delinquency percentage multiplied by the default ratio
multiplied by the loss severity. Foreclosure laws impact on this percentage as jurisdictions with effective and timely foreclosure laws
have a greater possibility of reducing the loss severity and conse202. Id. at 264.
203. Stump, supra note 196, at 198-99.
204. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 267.

205. Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 10.
206. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 266-67.
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quently the loss percentage of the portfolio. Issuers in these jurisdictions will 20be
in a better position to ensure the continued servicing of
7
the debt.
The Latin American legal systems have failed to create a positive environment for creditors to recover their investments and evict delinquent
borrowers. 20 8 In turn, because lenders do not have these necessary protections, they are not likely to invest in this region. The solution to this
problem will likely require a combination of legislative and judicial
changes to increase the protections for lenders, along with social programs to encourage respect for the credit system and the responsibility to
pay debts when they become due.
Several proposals have been put forth to remedy these legal short comings. "One option involves the creation of extra-judicial mechanisms to
speed the process of recovering mortgage credit guarantees. ' 20 9 Some
Latin American countries, seeking to institute such a program, passed
legislation allowing lenders to place a clause in the mortgage contract
allowing the lender to evict the borrower and repossess the property if
the "borrower becomes delinquent chronically. ' 21 0 The meaning of "delinquent chronically" is up for interpretation, but the fact remains that
legislation such as this is a tremendous step forward in the struggle to
modernize Latin America's mortgage industry.
Another such proposal works in much the same way as a deed of trust
functions in the United States. 21 1 It works by delaying the 21issuance
of
2
legal title to the borrower until the mortgage is paid in full.
Leading the way for reform of the foreclosure laws in Latin America is
Argentina. 213 In 1995, Argentina passed the Trust Law, which instituted
a "non-judicial foreclosure procedure and summary eviction proceeding."'214 The process allows a creditor to file for foreclosure after the borrower is sixty days in default. 21 5 After the filing, the debtor has fifteen
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 266.
Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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§ 29 (rev. 2d ed. 2006).
It is sometimes stated ...

that a mortgagee under a common law mort-

gage, having a lien on or title to the mortgagor's property for the purpose
of securing the payment of a debt, is a trustee. This seems clearly inaccurate ... he does not hold it for the benefit of another but rather for his
own advantage. The sole purpose of the transaction is the protection of
the mortgagee-creditor . . . [tihe relation between the mortgagor and

mortgagee is not a fiduciary one ...[r]ather it is a business relationship,
in which transactions with regard to the property and between the parties
are valid in the absence of fraud or some other positive invalidating
cause. Id.
212. Housing Finance in Latin America, supra note 9, at 5.

213. Poindexter, supra note 15, at 271.
214. Id.
215. Id.

2007]

ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING

days to cure default or the creditor can obtain a court order.21 6 Despite
the progress that the Trust Law represents, old ways die hard. Remember that in 2001, Argentina's lawmakers instituted a twenty-one month
ban on mortgage foreclosures.2 17 And in 2003, Argentina's President
sought to extend that ban. 2 18 But when you consider that, historically,
the average length of foreclosure proceedings in Argentina was two
years, the new Trust Law is a large leap forward in protecting the rights of
creditors.
Mexico has seen its own share of progress in terms of modifying its
antiquated foreclosure laws. The majority of Mexican states have
changed their foreclosure laws to allow for more efficient foreclosures. 21 9
While the Mexican process is not extra-judicial like Argentina's, it allows
a lender to begin foreclosure proceedings when a borrower has been in
default for two months, and seeks to streamline the foreclosure process
from "an average of five years to a time frame of six to twelve
months."

220

Changes in Mexico's secured lending laws have been ongoing for quite
some time. Beginning in 1992, the "National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (NLCIFT) began to consult with the Mexican governmen
...

shortly prior to the approval of NAFIA, on how to harmonize Ca-

nada, Mexico, and U.S. laws of secured transactions."' 22 1 An initial meeting to plan for the harmonization of Mexican secured financing laws was
held that year, and as a result of the process, several changes in Mexican
secured financing law were instituted. 22 2 The changes involved "imaginative provisions which proved that Mexico's substantive law of secured
transactions could be modernized without harm to Mexico's civil law tradition. ' 223 Also, the changes "recognized the distinction between ownership and possessory rights

.

. . set forth simple and inexpensive

attachment, perfection, and priority procedures and carved out an excep'224
tion for purchase money security interests.
Brazil also enacted a new secured transactions law, Law 9514, that "updated the procedures to seize and liquidate the property upon a debtor's
default. '225 The new law reduces the foreclosure process from six or
seven years down to one year.2 26 This law represents a marked change
from Brazil's past foreclosure policies, as Brazil had the honor of having
one of the lengthiest foreclosure processes in Latin America. Changes
216. Id.
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similar to those discussed are occurring all over Latin America as governments realize that mortgage-backed securitization is not just a passing
2 27
trend, but the modern direction for international securities markets.
III.

CONCLUSION

Latin America has made some significant gains in modernizing and expanding its mortgage markets and addressing the pressing issues of poverty and lack of available housing for low- and medium-income Latin
Americans. There is still a long way to go, however, before the quality of
housing in Latin America will meet adequate standards. The low- and
middle-income population of Latin America constantly struggles to find
and maintain the safe and sanitary housing that is so fundamental to an
enjoyable and full life.
The Latin American housing and finance markets are inexorably intertwined, and any successful modernization policy must address both issues.
The housing market and poor housing conditions in Latin America can be
rectified through a four-part reform of housing policies. A program of
direct housing subsidies must be adopted and fully funded to enable lowand medium-income Latin Americans to repair and expand their current
homes, and purchase new ones. For the extremely low-income segment
of the population, supply-side government involvement, in the form of
social housing programs, is needed to create adequate housing. Moreover, social programs that invest development money for infrastructure in
the most impoverished areas will dramatically improve the living conditions in some of the worst Latin American slums. Similarly, micto-lending institutions prove invaluable in assisting with home repair and
replacement, and infrastructure development. Lastly, land titling reforms
and increased access to land will enable low- and medium-income Latin
Americans to obtain land outside of the urban slums and feel secure in
knowing that they possess legal title to the land.
Despite the bumpy road that Latin America's financial markets have
traversed, they possess tremendous growth potential. Modernization of
the financial markets requires a three-step process. The primary mortgage markets must be more fully developed to provide credit to a broader
segment of the Latin American population. Next, Latin America's secured lending laws need to be modernized and harmonized to provide
stable secondary markets for residential mortgage-backed securities.
Lastly, in line with reforming Latin American secured lending laws, legal
protections for secured creditors must be put in place.
Many Latin American governments have taken great leaps in meeting
these goals and satisfying their country's housing and mortgage finance
needs. Yet there remains a long way to go before the poorest Latin
Americans have the same opportunities for safe and sanitary living conditions that the wealthiest do.
227. See id. at 257.

